MFK Origon
Here's another AH Naval Thread for your consideration, Comment, and hopefully enjoyment.
Part One.
Extract: - The Politics of Rearmaent: The Development of German War Fighting Capabilities During the Interwar Period. Prof. Steve Corus, University of Illinois Press 1987.
Occurring concurrently was the simultaneous and rapid build-up of the German Army and Air Force which demanded substantial effort and resources. That the army had higher priority for high tensile steel armor plate for tanks helped limit building plans for the expansion Raeder hoped for under the Nazi’s. That the Luftwaffe had a near-complete monopoly on all German military aviation, including naval aviation, was a source of great interservice rivalry with the Kriegsmarine as well as limiting the scope of naval aviation.
That any form of nascent naval air arm was able to avoid being quickly absorbed by Hermann Göring's newly established Luftwaffe, simply came down to Hitler in his role as absolute head of state and the armed forces. As he controlled the German Navy absolutely despite being a man with little or no knowledge of sea power, he was simply able to decree that a naval aviation force (Marineflieger Kommando - MFK) be formed separate from the Luftwaffe to provide units intended to serve aboard the future aircraft carriers and capital ships and provided the Kriegsmarine with some airpower from bases on land. Hitler had closely followed the developments in the RN/RAF conflict in the UK during 1931-33 and had been struck by the similarities between that and the evolving Interarms tensions developing in the German military. The basis for this autocratic decree was his own desire for an aircraft carrier to be laid down as a further symbol of growing German might, rather than any real recognition of the merits of a carrier-based aviation component for the navy.
Numerous historians have speculated the specific reasons for this autocratic decision, and it is commonly considered that without this, that it is highly probable that the progress on the Graf Zeppelin would possibly not have proceeded, in much the same manner as the non-conversion of HMS Tiger whilst the RAF had still controlled aviation matters in the UK. With a lack of suitable aircraft, coupled with the reluctance of the Luftwaffe to support the Kriegsmarine in the carrier's construction, it is probable that at best, work would have been delayed until well after hostilities commenced in WW2. That this arrangement came to be a success can largely be attributed to the initial officer appointed to occupy the post of the new arm, Generalmajor (Luftwaffe rank) and later Konteradmiral Walther Wever.
Marinefliegerkommando (MFK) 1933-39
The appointment of the undoubtedly capable and unusually suited Wever to this role by Hitler decree, quite literally arose from an accident in history. Wever had served as a respected and highly capable staff officer for the OHL, Army High Command, during WW1, and postwar had played a key role in the evolution of the new air force to the point where he was appointed as the nascent arms Chief of Staff in the early 1930s. His role in the initial molding of the Luftwaffe's battle doctrine and strategic plans, and establishing links with the technical and industrial contacts, was pivotal during the formation of the Luftwaffe as part of German rearmament plans. This ensured his familiarity with virtually all the key players both industrial and within the services during this period, when he was severely injured in an air crash in 1933.
On 3 May 1933 Wever flew from Berlin to Rostock to discuss design issues of new Heinkel aircraft in person with the company’s founder Ernst Heinkel at the company’s Rostock headquarters. On his return journey the Heinkel He 70 Blitz aircraft that he was flying had not been properly examined during preflight checks. Unaware that aileron gust locks had been fitted after landing and not removed by the Heinkel field groundcrews he took off. The aircraft was barely airborne when these caused the wing to dip, and the Heinkel stalled and crashed from a low altitude. Though failing to explode, the crash killed his flight engineer and severely injured Wever who was trapped in the wreckage for some time. Fortunate to survive and rendered unfit for flying duties, this chance occurrence resulted in his availability to guide the early development of the new arm. (1)
Widely recognized as an unusually capable and intellectual staff officer, Wever had been one of the early air power theorists behind doctrinal development for the Luftwaffe at this time, particularly as a proponent for strategic bombing. Beyond these acknowledged attributes and little recognized at this time, was that his greatest skill was his ability to handle people. He remained friends to many key personalities in the evolving and intensely competitive Reich arms industry and was not only known and respected, but also proved skillfully able to balance many of the key competing factions and personalities of German Rearmament. This would later lead to him being later widely acknowledged as the father of German naval aviation.
Part One.
Extract: - The Politics of Rearmaent: The Development of German War Fighting Capabilities During the Interwar Period. Prof. Steve Corus, University of Illinois Press 1987.
Occurring concurrently was the simultaneous and rapid build-up of the German Army and Air Force which demanded substantial effort and resources. That the army had higher priority for high tensile steel armor plate for tanks helped limit building plans for the expansion Raeder hoped for under the Nazi’s. That the Luftwaffe had a near-complete monopoly on all German military aviation, including naval aviation, was a source of great interservice rivalry with the Kriegsmarine as well as limiting the scope of naval aviation.
That any form of nascent naval air arm was able to avoid being quickly absorbed by Hermann Göring's newly established Luftwaffe, simply came down to Hitler in his role as absolute head of state and the armed forces. As he controlled the German Navy absolutely despite being a man with little or no knowledge of sea power, he was simply able to decree that a naval aviation force (Marineflieger Kommando - MFK) be formed separate from the Luftwaffe to provide units intended to serve aboard the future aircraft carriers and capital ships and provided the Kriegsmarine with some airpower from bases on land. Hitler had closely followed the developments in the RN/RAF conflict in the UK during 1931-33 and had been struck by the similarities between that and the evolving Interarms tensions developing in the German military. The basis for this autocratic decree was his own desire for an aircraft carrier to be laid down as a further symbol of growing German might, rather than any real recognition of the merits of a carrier-based aviation component for the navy.
Numerous historians have speculated the specific reasons for this autocratic decision, and it is commonly considered that without this, that it is highly probable that the progress on the Graf Zeppelin would possibly not have proceeded, in much the same manner as the non-conversion of HMS Tiger whilst the RAF had still controlled aviation matters in the UK. With a lack of suitable aircraft, coupled with the reluctance of the Luftwaffe to support the Kriegsmarine in the carrier's construction, it is probable that at best, work would have been delayed until well after hostilities commenced in WW2. That this arrangement came to be a success can largely be attributed to the initial officer appointed to occupy the post of the new arm, Generalmajor (Luftwaffe rank) and later Konteradmiral Walther Wever.
Marinefliegerkommando (MFK) 1933-39
The appointment of the undoubtedly capable and unusually suited Wever to this role by Hitler decree, quite literally arose from an accident in history. Wever had served as a respected and highly capable staff officer for the OHL, Army High Command, during WW1, and postwar had played a key role in the evolution of the new air force to the point where he was appointed as the nascent arms Chief of Staff in the early 1930s. His role in the initial molding of the Luftwaffe's battle doctrine and strategic plans, and establishing links with the technical and industrial contacts, was pivotal during the formation of the Luftwaffe as part of German rearmament plans. This ensured his familiarity with virtually all the key players both industrial and within the services during this period, when he was severely injured in an air crash in 1933.
On 3 May 1933 Wever flew from Berlin to Rostock to discuss design issues of new Heinkel aircraft in person with the company’s founder Ernst Heinkel at the company’s Rostock headquarters. On his return journey the Heinkel He 70 Blitz aircraft that he was flying had not been properly examined during preflight checks. Unaware that aileron gust locks had been fitted after landing and not removed by the Heinkel field groundcrews he took off. The aircraft was barely airborne when these caused the wing to dip, and the Heinkel stalled and crashed from a low altitude. Though failing to explode, the crash killed his flight engineer and severely injured Wever who was trapped in the wreckage for some time. Fortunate to survive and rendered unfit for flying duties, this chance occurrence resulted in his availability to guide the early development of the new arm. (1)
Widely recognized as an unusually capable and intellectual staff officer, Wever had been one of the early air power theorists behind doctrinal development for the Luftwaffe at this time, particularly as a proponent for strategic bombing. Beyond these acknowledged attributes and little recognized at this time, was that his greatest skill was his ability to handle people. He remained friends to many key personalities in the evolving and intensely competitive Reich arms industry and was not only known and respected, but also proved skillfully able to balance many of the key competing factions and personalities of German Rearmament. This would later lead to him being later widely acknowledged as the father of German naval aviation.
1. IRL on 3 June 1936 Wever flew from Berlin to Dresden to give a lecture. On his return journey as detailed the Heinkel He 70 Blitz that he was piloting had not been properly examined during preflight checks, and the aileron gust locks had not been removed. The aircraft took off, and the Heinkel stalled and went into a horizontal cartwheel, crashed and exploded, killing Wever and removing one of the more visionary and capable Luftwaffe leaders of the period. A key supporter of the strategic bombing concept his untimely death left the Luftwaffe lacking clear planning direction. Though not subordinated to the army support role, the use of air power in support of ground forces came to dominate for tactical and operational missions and aircraft designs after his death. Many historians regard his death and the subsequent failure to develop some form of strategic bombing capability as a key Luftwaffe weakness during WW2.