Now Nevarinemex, look what you've done with that careless tank about tanks, we've got Cryhavo101, alspug, Butchpfd and 173rdLRRP all excited, and yet we all know tanks can't go through jungle, they'll be of no use in Malaya!
You are assuming that Malaya has had no development since colonisation. It was largely covered with rubber plantations before WWII, being a major producer of latex. There were patched of tropical rainforest but they were not dominant, except in central Malaya.
 
Border provinces in both Laos and Cambodia were signed over, and to help compensate the French, the Thais would make a payment of six million Piastres as a concession to them.
I may well have got the currency conversions wrong, but that looks like a token payment at best. Around £300k ish if I jumped through the currencies correctly, an amount which will almost get you a single destroyer or some fraction of squadron of bombers. No real compensation for the loss of territory and not even close to the cost of the lost material.

In any case an interesting detail that the Japanese cared enough to help the French save a bit of face with the payment, especially given their later actions.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
I may well have got the currency conversions wrong, but that looks like a token payment at best. Around £300k ish if I jumped through the currencies correctly, an amount which will almost get you a single destroyer or some fraction of squadron of bombers. No real compensation for the loss of territory and not even close to the cost of the lost material.

In any case an interesting detail that the Japanese cared enough to help the French save a bit of face with the payment, especially given their later actions.
I wasn't sure about this, but when I tried to find out I got
1 Piastres = 10 Francs in 1941

and 60,000,000 Francs = 1,285,714 US Dollars or 318,584 pounds sterling in 1941

I'd say you was on the money here, and a single Wellington bomber was about £20,000
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
You are assuming that Malaya has had no development since colonisation. It was largely covered with rubber plantations before WWII, being a major producer of latex. There were patched of tropical rainforest but they were not dominant, except in central Malaya.
SECTION I.—TOPOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE.

Malaya is some 400 miles long as the crow flies. The length of the main road and the west coast railway from Singapore to the Malaya - Thailand frontier is approximately 600 miles. The width of the country varies from about 200 miles in the widest part to about 60 miles in the narrowest. Singapore Island lies at the southern end of the peninsula and is separated from it by the narrow Straits of Johore. Malaya is bounded on all sides, except on the North, by sea.

The area of Malaya is approximately equal to that of England and Wales excluding the western Welsh counties and the Devon-Cornwall Peninsula. The Island of Singapore corresponds approximately in size and position to the Isle of Wight. The distance from Singapore to the Thai border is much the same as that from the Isle of Wight to the Tweed. An extensive mountain range forms a backbone to the peninsula separating the western and eastern areas. There are only a few communications between West and East. Apart from this mountain range the country is for the most part low-lying and rather featureless except for a few small hills on Singapore Island.

Malaya is thickly covered with vegetation. Where the country has not been brought under cultivation it is covered with jungle. This jungle is of varying types. Some of it is dense' and difficult to penetrate while in other parts it consists of heavy timber and, while providing cover from view, is little or no obstacle to the passage of animals or men. Of the cultivated areas the greatest part is planted with rubber. Rubber plantations, while providing good cover from the air, can easily be traversed by men on foot, by animals and in most places by light tracked vehicles. There are also coconut and other plantations. Rice is grown in the north of the peninsula, which is generally more open, and also in certain areas on the west 'Coast. In the centre and parts of the north there are rich tin-mining deposits, the working of which has resulted in more open areas. Except for the rice and tin-mining areas visibility is almost everywhere restricted to a hundred yards or even less.

The west coast area is much more developed and more thickly populated than is the east. Through it run the main road and rail communications linking Singapore with the North. There are, also a coastal road, a number of lateral roads, especially in the central area, and branch railway lines linking the mam line with coastal centres.

The east coast railway branches from the main line at Gemas and, running east of the mountain range, strikes the coast in the State of Kelantan in north-east Malaya and then, running parallel to the coast, re-joins the main line at Hat Yai in Thailand. There are very few roads in the east coast area, the only ones of importance being those constructed to connect the ports of Mersing, Endau and Kuantan with the interior and the internal road system of the State of Kelantan. The only land communications between this latter State and the rest of Malaya are a single line railway and a fine-weather coastal track.

On the east coast there are good. sandy beaches almost throughout. There are also some good stretches of sandy beach on the west coast, but a great deal of this coast line is covered by mangrove swamps. Numerous rivers and streams, rising in the mountain range, traverse the coastal areas before reaching the sea. The largest of these is the River Perak in the northern part of the west coast area. The Island of Penang lies off the west coast of Malaya some 350 miles as the crow flies, from Singapore

To sum up, the country generally tends to restrict the power of artillery and of Armoured Fighting Vehicles. It places a premium on the skill and endurance of infantry. As is true of most types of close country, it favours the attacker.

The climate throughout Malaya is humid and enervating, though not unhealthy for normal people. The temperature, which is not excessive, varies little throughout the year. Similarly, the rainfall, which comes mostly in tropical storms, is fairly evenly distributed throughout the year. Between April and September, the wind blows from the south-west, and between October and March it blows from the north-east. During the latter period rough seas are at times encountered on the east coast.

Operations of Malaya Command – Lt Gen Percival
 
SECTION I.—TOPOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE.

Malaya is some 400 miles long as the crow flies. The length of the main road and the west coast railway from Singapore to the Malaya - Thailand frontier is approximately 600 miles. The width of the country varies from about 200 miles in the widest part to about 60 miles in the narrowest. Singapore Island lies at the southern end of the peninsula and is separated from it by the narrow Straits of Johore. Malaya is bounded on all sides, except on the North, by sea.

The area of Malaya is approximately equal to that of England and Wales excluding the western Welsh counties and the Devon-Cornwall Peninsula. The Island of Singapore corresponds approximately in size and position to the Isle of Wight. The distance from Singapore to the Thai border is much the same as that from the Isle of Wight to the Tweed. An extensive mountain range forms a backbone to the peninsula separating the western and eastern areas. There are only a few communications between West and East. Apart from this mountain range the country is for the most part low-lying and rather featureless except for a few small hills on Singapore Island.

Malaya is thickly covered with vegetation. Where the country has not been brought under cultivation it is covered with jungle. This jungle is of varying types. Some of it is dense' and difficult to penetrate while in other parts it consists of heavy timber and, while providing cover from view, is little or no obstacle to the passage of animals or men. Of the cultivated areas the greatest part is planted with rubber. Rubber plantations, while providing good cover from the air, can easily be traversed by men on foot, by animals and in most places by light tracked vehicles. There are also coconut and other plantations. Rice is grown in the north of the peninsula, which is generally more open, and also in certain areas on the west 'Coast. In the centre and parts of the north there are rich tin-mining deposits, the working of which has resulted in more open areas. Except for the rice and tin-mining areas visibility is almost everywhere restricted to a hundred yards or even less.

The west coast area is much more developed and more thickly populated than is the east. Through it run the main road and rail communications linking Singapore with the North. There are, also a coastal road, a number of lateral roads, especially in the central area, and branch railway lines linking the mam line with coastal centres.

The east coast railway branches from the main line at Gemas and, running east of the mountain range, strikes the coast in the State of Kelantan in north-east Malaya and then, running parallel to the coast, re-joins the main line at Hat Yai in Thailand. There are very few roads in the east coast area, the only ones of importance being those constructed to connect the ports of Mersing, Endau and Kuantan with the interior and the internal road system of the State of Kelantan. The only land communications between this latter State and the rest of Malaya are a single line railway and a fine-weather coastal track.

On the east coast there are good. sandy beaches almost throughout. There are also some good stretches of sandy beach on the west coast, but a great deal of this coast line is covered by mangrove swamps. Numerous rivers and streams, rising in the mountain range, traverse the coastal areas before reaching the sea. The largest of these is the River Perak in the northern part of the west coast area. The Island of Penang lies off the west coast of Malaya some 350 miles as the crow flies, from Singapore

To sum up, the country generally tends to restrict the power of artillery and of Armoured Fighting Vehicles. It places a premium on the skill and endurance of infantry. As is true of most types of close country, it favours the attacker.

The climate throughout Malaya is humid and enervating, though not unhealthy for normal people. The temperature, which is not excessive, varies little throughout the year. Similarly, the rainfall, which comes mostly in tropical storms, is fairly evenly distributed throughout the year. Between April and September, the wind blows from the south-west, and between October and March it blows from the north-east. During the latter period rough seas are at times encountered on the east coast.

Operations of Malaya Command – Lt Gen Percival
Nice to see his incompetence extended to the weather, rainfall is most definitely not even in most of Malaysia, pick the wrong months (Mar/Apr or Oct/Nov) and you know it.
 
I read The War in Malaya online. There was some insight shown. It just seemed very detached to me. Similar to a debrief following an exercise. No incisive
analogy or any real hindsight offered. An impartial Senior Staff Officer perhaps?

He presides over the greatest surrender in British history, but other than that, it couldn't have been different? I don't know if mine is the right analogy. It
seemed as though, to paraphrase ADM Beatty, "There is something bloody wrong with our troops this campaign."

Am I reading this right?
Basically, not a leader, no drive, no urgency to train troops or even check supplies especially ammunition. He did not bother to build better defences despite having the time before the invasion. No inclination to try and work out how to fight in jungle, very defeatist, no imagination etc. What was sent to Malaya was the third team, but the rot started at the top.
Someone like Montgomery, with his mania for training and preparation could have done a lot better. Slow down the Japanese and they run out of supply, defensive boxes held by men trained that they might be temporally surrounded, and the Japanese infiltrators are far less effective. Singapore if not taken on the bounce, can easily hold long enough for the allies to reinforce enough to start to push back.
 
If an Australian Division arrived in Burma 1942, do they develop successful tactics on the fly as in PNG?

A USMC monograph on their History of Armored Warfare mentions the interactions with the US Army..... The Marines attended training at Ft. Benning. The did not receive formal doctrine from Ft. Knox. A distinct disadvantage if you are to fight in Africa or Europe. However, there is no doctrine to unlearn for amphibious assault or jungle fighting.
The Marines DID work extensively on developing amphibious doctrine and the equipment for it between wars (they were afraid of being absorbed into the Army, so needed a reason to exist, and latched onto amphibious warfare), and had extensive practical experience in the jungles of the Caribbean and Central American fighting in the Banana Wars as well. While alot of the newly enlisted were green, many of the veteran officers and NCOs had experience in both. Chesty Puller, for example, was one such that had done both, fighting in the Banana Wars and working on developing amphibious doctrine.
In many ways, the early campaigns were more of a testing ground for figuring out what prewar ideas and kit was good enough as is, what needed to be worked on or further refined, and what just needed to be tossed out completely.
 
I agree. It's the JO's and NCO's who will be the determining factor. They'll be the personnel most exposed to combat. It's up to the Field Grade officer to insist upon, develop and follow up with a proper troop training regimen.
In the Corps, the Field Grade Officers administrate and plan of course, yeah, but in reality it's the staff NCOs that do the real training and actually did the bulk of the development of said regime. All...suggested...politely, of course.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
I agree. It's the JO's and NCO's who will be the determining factor. They'll be the personnel most exposed to combat. It's up to the Field Grade officer to insist upon, develop and follow up with a proper troop training regimen.
and
In the Corps, the Field Grade Officers administrate and plan of course, yeah, but in reality it's the staff NCOs that do the real training and actually did the bulk of the development of said regime. All...suggested...politely, of course.
A major problem for Percival in Malaya, both historically and in my timeline is the massive expansion of the Indian Army has left the above said key personnel very thin on the ground, and they need training too!
 
MWI 41051215 Aussie Commandos

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Monday 12 May;

Lord Gort was beginning to despair, the complaints seemed endless, first the transport arrangements for the newly arrived Australians hadn’t been good enough, trucks having to be borrowed, and some Australians having to drive the trucks themselves. Then the accommodation, barracks were unfinished, cookhouse and latrine facilities were not correct, even parade grounds not finished with white painted stones. And now it was about the newly formed Australian units here in Malaya.

It wasn’t that some of his grievances weren’t justified, but the way he spoke to you, that no one could get it right, everyone was a fool, and no one knew better than him. Gort didn’t know what he disliked about Bennett the most, his rudeness, his arrogance or his condescending manner that all staff officers were incapable of even the simplest tasks. They only thing in Bennett’s favour was Canberra was as weary of him as Gort was, but was willing to agree to quite a lot of things just to keep him out of their hair. The saying “what goes on in Malaya, stays in Malaya” seems to have become their watchword.

So, when Gort heard of the availably of the guns, asking Bennett if he wanted them, and Bennett’s suggestion they raise an Australian Medium Artillery Regt, it all seemed such a good idea, however he was beginning to regret he’d even mentioned it. The 12 ex HKSRA guns from Hong Kong, along with another 4 from India had been the basis for forming the two 8-gun batteries, 68 and 69. With some transfers from the two Australian artillery units currently in Malaya, and some new recruits, they had the raw makings of the Regt. It was going to be hard work, but with instructors from the British 6th Medium Regt helping, they expected to be operational by the 1st January 1942. But then the complaints came, the 6-inch Howitzers were dirty, they didn’t have enough tractors for them, the British gunners kept different working hours. Bennett just hadn’t stop; the man was a complete nightmare.

And what really stretched Gort’s goodwill was the demands Bennett made for his two Independent Companies, the Commandos as Bennett was calling them. Having heard that acting on British advice, the Australian Army was raising an Independent Company, no 2/1, at the Wilson’s Promontory training school in Victoria, he’d decided to get in on the act. Consequently, 2/2 had been raised from the 22nd Brigade, and 2/3 from the 23rd Brigade, taking only single men. Back in Australia it was thought they might be used as garrisons for the Dutch island airfields with stationed RAAF units. Bennett thought otherwise, and Gort was with him on this. They were not going to be just garrison companies, there were far better uses for them than that.

2/2 was to be trained in amphibious operations and Layton had magnanimously agreed to the forming of a Perak Flotilla, with six RN Malay manned launches and a mother ship, as yet not converted. The Flotilla and 2/2 company were to be based at Teluk Anson, abet the accommodation wasn’t yet built. Predictably Bennett had moaned about that, but what really taxed Gort’s patience was his demands to having control over the Perak Flotilla, something that had led to Layton telling Gort if Bennett didn’t pull his horns in, he might have a boating accident. Gort wasn’t totally sure Layton said that as a joke, but he’d firmly told Bennet the Flotilla remains with the Navy.

2/3 Company was supposed to be an easier proposition. Planned as a deep jungle unit, it was going to be equipped with mules, and lavished with mortars, machine guns and sub machine guns. As yet they had none of those, furthermore the informal nature of operations in the jungle had already led to clashes between Bennet, who wanted the men smartly dressed, and the instructors, old Malaya hands, who knew the practicalities of operating in deep jungle. A number of them, displaying a free spirt, which made even the Australians look rigid, had just simply refused to work with him. And a joke made by one individual, about Bennett meeting a machete on a dark night had been met by Gort with an immediate demotion and transfer, despite the individual saying it was a joke. The Australians, Gort valued hugely, but Bennett was someone he needed about as much as he needed another hole in his head.
 
and

A major problem for Percival in Malaya, both historically and in my timeline is the massive expansion of the Indian Army has left the above said key personnel very thin on the ground, and they need training too!
How the Corps would function without its Gunnys (Gunnery Sergeants) through Sergeant Majors is a mystery known only to God. Which is logical since God answers to the Gunny! Thus I can see the problem the Indian Army has. The Marines got around this three ways: First was already being both top heavy in NCO ranks and having these trained to do the job of the man at least a rank higher, if not more. Second was calling up every reservist under retirement age, and a few over, still alive and able and putting them back in uniform. Since the Corps tended to get into fights somewhere every few years this meant a large pool of veterans to promote back to rank or even promote higher. Lastly speed up field promotions and cut the time spent in NCO school to the minimum. After all, in war the proper parade wearing of dress blues and other niceties were kinda pointless, just teach the men how to lead, plan, and fight, if they didn't already, and slap sergeant stripes on them. On the whole it worked, if not always perfectly.
A forty-year-old First Sergeants' six years experience fighting bandits in the mountain jungles of Haiti may translate well to fighting in the Bismarks, but a thirty year old formally retired corporal's six years experience guarding the American Consulate in Shanghai...not so much. But at least he knows how to not panic under fire, right?
 
1941, Monday 12 May;

Lord Gort was beginning to despair, the complaints seemed endless, first the transport arrangements for the newly arrived Australians hadn’t been good enough, trucks having to be borrowed, and some Australians having to drive the trucks themselves. Then the accommodation, barracks were unfinished, cookhouse and latrine facilities were not correct, even parade grounds not finished with white painted stones. And now it was about the newly formed Australian units here in Malaya.

It wasn’t that some of his grievances weren’t justified, but the way he spoke to you, that no one could get it right, everyone was a fool, and no one knew better than him. Gort didn’t know what he disliked about Bennett the most, his rudeness, his arrogance or his condescending manner that all staff officers were incapable of even the simplest tasks. They only thing in Bennett’s favour was Canberra was as weary of him as Gort was, but was willing to agree to quite a lot of things just to keep him out of their hair. The saying “what goes on in Malaya, stays in Malaya” seems to have become their watchword.

So, when Gort heard of the availably of the guns, asking Bennett if he wanted them, and Bennett’s suggestion they raise an Australian Medium Artillery Regt, it all seemed such a good idea, however he was beginning to regret he’d even mentioned it. The 12 ex HKSRA guns from Hong Kong, along with another 4 from India had been the basis for forming the two 8-gun batteries, 68 and 69. With some transfers from the two Australian artillery units currently in Malaya, and some new recruits, they had the raw makings of the Regt. It was going to be hard work, but with instructors from the British 6th Medium Regt helping, they expected to be operational by the 1st January 1942. But then the complaints came, the 6-inch Howitzers were dirty, they didn’t have enough tractors for them, the British gunners kept different working hours. Bennett just hadn’t stop; the man was a complete nightmare.

And what really stretched Gort’s goodwill was the demands Bennett made for his two Independent Companies, the Commandos as Bennett was calling them. Having heard that acting on British advice, the Australian Army was raising an Independent Company, no 2/1, at the Wilson’s Promontory training school in Victoria, he’d decided to get in on the act. Consequently, 2/2 had been raised from the 22nd Brigade, and 2/3 from the 23rd Brigade, taking only single men. Back in Australia it was thought they might be used as garrisons for the Dutch island airfields with stationed RAAF units. Bennett thought otherwise, and Gort was with him on this. They were not going to be just garrison companies, there were far better uses for them than that.

2/2 was to be trained in amphibious operations and Layton had magnanimously agreed to the forming of a Perak Flotilla, with six RN Malay manned launches and a mother ship, as yet not converted. The Flotilla and 2/2 company were to be based at Teluk Anson, abet the accommodation wasn’t yet built. Predictably Bennett had moaned about that, but what really taxed Gort’s patience was his demands to having control over the Perak Flotilla, something that had led to Layton telling Gort if Bennett didn’t pull his horns in, he might have a boating accident. Gort wasn’t totally sure Layton said that as a joke, but he’d firmly told Bennet the Flotilla remains with the Navy.

2/3 Company was supposed to be an easier proposition. Planned as a deep jungle unit, it was going to be equipped with mules, and lavished with mortars, machine guns and sub machine guns. As yet they had none of those, furthermore the informal nature of operations in the jungle had already led to clashes between Bennet, who wanted the men smartly dressed, and the instructors, old Malaya hands, who knew the practicalities of operating in deep jungle. A number of them, displaying a free spirt, which made even the Australians look rigid, had just simply refused to work with him. And a joke made by one individual, about Bennett meeting a machete on a dark night had been met by Gort with an immediate demotion and transfer, despite the individual saying it was a joke. The Australians, Gort valued hugely, but Bennett was someone he needed about as much as he needed another hole in his head.
Poor, poor, Gordon Bennett.
 
Poor, poor, Gordon Bennett.
Okay, at least I heard he could fight...more or less, but NO subordinate is worth that much headache.

And don't bring up MacArthur, he wasn't subordinate but to three men, none of whom had to deal with daily (or even monthly, for which they thanked God daily, I'm sure), and being the cunning politician he was when wanted to be could actually be charming if he wanted to be.
Bennett doesn't seem to know what charm is!
 
Okay, at least I heard he could fight...more or less, but NO subordinate is worth that much headache.

And don't bring up MacArthur, he wasn't subordinate but to three men, none of whom had to deal with daily (or even monthly, for which they thanked God daily, I'm sure), and being the cunning politician he was when wanted to be could actually be charming if he wanted to be.
Bennett doesn't seem to know what charm is!
You realise we are only hearing one side of him? I am sure he had a reason for his demands. He wanted the best for his boys.
 
Seems even some of his own boys want to meet him on a dark jungle trail with a machete. I mean, by-the-book proper uniform regs for jungle commando operations? Even "The Almighty" MacArthur didn't give a shit about about that piss ant stuff. Just get it done.
If Bennett is so damned concerned then indeed have his men drive their own trucks, finish their own barracks, clean their own artillery, and paint their own damned rocks so the shit that needs doing gets done and men get the training needed instead of wasting time on this penny waste political bullshit. Doesn't Bennett realize what a shoestring operation he's landed in? Everyone is doing what needs doing so does he. Problem solve you bastard, and stop complaining.
When Cherry Puller's Marine regiment found they lacked barracks when they arrived in Australia after Guadalcanal, he didn't stomp his feet and go bitching. He problem solved. Chesty looked around, found a football stadium, asked the local mayor if his men could sleep in the stands and use the locker room facilities...then bothered to inform the military higher ups he had a problem with proper sleeping arrangements and that needed a more permanent solution.
THAT'S proper caring for your men and DOING something about it! Likely a legend (the man has more about him than King Arthur), but the point is Marine Field Grade and General Officers use it as an example of how you're SUPPOSED to handle such a situation. Aka: Don't bitch, just fix.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Regarding my last post, this is all my timeline, and not historical. Yes there were 2/2 and 2/3 Independent company's, but both raised in Victoria after 2/1. The next one raised at the Victoria training school will be the historically correct 2/4.

There was also, no Australian Medium Artillery Regt raised in Malaya, the 12 guns used from Hong Kong remained in Hong Kong historically.

And finally Maj Gen Gordon Bennett, well what do I say about him. As you can guess my opinion of him isn't very high, but as Richshaw says, there's good and bad in nearly everyone, and there was some good in Bennett. The complaints I've used are fictitious, but Bennett was more than capable of raising them in my opinion. I do think he was concerned about the welfare of his men, but somewhere along the way his distain for professional officers of the Australian Army, and later the British, became a dominate characteristic of his, making working with him very difficult for pretty much all concerned.
 
He also just about encouraged conflict between pre-war Regular and Militia officers; and I cannot forgive him ordering his troops to make no attempt to escape while he did so himself.
Was shocked when I read this. Like, legitimately stunned. Up until now, my understanding was he essentially told them it was 'every man for himself', which made his own escape somewhat justifiable in my eyes. If your version is the correct one, well... it completely changes my view of him and more or less negates whatever successes he achieved against the Japanese OTL. To put it mildly.
 
Sounds like he would have fit in well with USN ADM Richmond K. "Terrible" Turner and USMC GEN Holland M. "Howling Mad" Smith. Paraphrasing Kipling, "For it's Army this and Army that, chuck them out the terrible brutes"

Were the six(6) inch guns DP? How about the 9.2(?) inch guns? Thanks in advance.
Are you asking if th heavy guns are both seacoast and field fire capable, or Field and AAA capable? Normally the reference dual purpose references to AAA and surface or field artillery or AT
 
Was shocked when I read this. Like, legitimately stunned. Up until now, my understanding was he essentially told them it was 'every man for himself', which made his own escape somewhat justifiable in my eyes. If your version is the correct one, well... it completely changes my view of him and more or less negates whatever successes he achieved against the Japanese OTL. To put it mildly.
Yes, it is what happened. Several groups were planning to make a break after news of the surrender was released, but stopped on being informed of the order. :evilupset:
 
What you have to understand is that in Australia there were essentially two armies between the wars. The Regular army and the Militia army. The first were confined essentially to fortress and staff roles and the second to basically field roles. The army was further divided, we had the AIF and the militia. The AIF was formed in wartime to be able to deploy overseas on "Imperial duties" and the militia for home duties. The AIF was paid slightly better than the Militia. The regular army was looked down upon by the militia, which was made up of "citizen-soldiers" - basically part-timers and who reserved to themselves most of the command roles. In Australia we also had a long history of the "larrikin" - the roustabout civilian who ran around being trouble to his superiors and but essentially did the right thing in the end. Bennett believed he was better than most people, so good that he fled Singapore because he believed he was going to head the AIF (Australian Imperial Force). To Americans this must sound strange and even to the British it is inexplicable but to Australians it is normal. After WWII ended we established our first regular infantry force the Royal Australia Regiment but that wasn't 1945.
 
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