Malaya What If
- Thread starter Fatboy Coxy
- Start date
Driftless
Donor
I think there were some long-standing control mandates about brown water responsibilities. The US Army had control of shore batteries and also Philippine littoral minefields (I believe). In OTL, did Mac also overrule naval attacks (subs, PTs, DDs) on the IJN invasion fleet at Lingayen Gulf, or was that a naval command decision?
Helfrich was a vice-admiral. Doorman was a rear-admiral (in Dutch that is the beautiful rank of schout-bij-nacht) but Hart certainly didn't need to answer to him. Even if he had to, that shouldn't have been the problem, as Doorman had the same view of what ABDA should do as Hart had: evacuate to Australia.
He was tired, and that made him defeatist. Don't get me wrong, Hart had every reason to be defeatist, it just made his tenure as commander of ABDAFLOAT untenable in the long run.
Helfrich played far from a glamorous role in this (or most other things for that matter), but you do have to understand the situation. The Dutch were just as forced to be part of ABDA as Hart was, and were only given the incredibly powerless ABDARM-command in return. Then you have the Britons who suffer from a severe case of Singaporitis, use your ships to escort their troop ships to Singapore, and when the ABDA-FLOAT commander turns up he seems to have given up on the defense of your country already and wants to retreat as many forces as possible to Australia, beginning with himself! This was not only the - always to be suspected - opinion and analysis of Helfrich, but also of Governor-General Tjarda van Starkenborch.
See above. The British wanted all those ships for the defense of their troopships.
I dont think the Japanese deployed their older battleships so in this case they may have used Fuso, Yamashiro, Ise and Hyuga. If this is in a close escort role it doesnt matter about being fast if all you have to do is escort troop convoys and look intimidating. Surface action unlikely to go well and at this stage of the war then even air attack on a BB is moot given effectiveness of US torps
What were Nagato and Mutsu up to at this point - were they deployed to Truk or at Harashisjima with the others?
That is what happened when war broke out. Hart received the official Orders about 0700 Manila time, " Japan has started hostilities, Conduct WPO-3C ( most current version) , Conduct unrestricted naval and submarine warfare against the Empire of Japan. Which is a bit ironic, since Hart's own orders to the Asiatic fleet issued about 0500 , were Japan has initiated hostilities, govern yourselves accordingly.
Hart's standing orders from Washington followed by 2nd message, severed all control Mac Arthur had over Hart.
Not possible this goes back to Adm. Yarnell's original request after the Panay sinking. Hart reiterated it in his Spring 1940 request for reinforcements. Even if Hart gets the air group they have to be Stationed in the Philippines, as no treaty existed between the USA and the Netherlands. Plus it would have violated the neutrality act.
What could or should have been done politicians willing and money available is build airfields at Cebu, Davo, Iloio, and improve DelMonte
What happens if it is an allied task group , or a cruiser, instead of the Edsall or Pillsbury that comes upon Kido Butai at 15 miles? The carriers could see the destroyers during the fights.. at that range the carriers are in range of 8" guns and the edge of 6" range..
Which would simply have been a gift to the Japanese unless this was accompanied by significant numbers of aircraft to operate from them and ground troops to protect them, neither of which were available absent a major change of priorities in Washington.
The USN's pre-war position on the defence of the Philippines was that it was hopeless, and that they should not be sending their ships in harm's way in a futile attempt to avert the inevitable (hell, the USN didn't even want to deploy the Pacific Fleet to Hawaii). Some of the planners in Washington may well have agreed, but for political reasons neither the State Department, the Army nor the Philippine government could accept that, so An Effort Had To Be Made, though not of course an effort that risked irreparable losses. And anyway, the late-1930s US simply didn't have the divisions of regular troops and wings of aircraft that would be needed to defeat a major Japanese invasion of the Philippines. And even once the build-up started in 1939-40, the new (green) battalions and squadrons were being held back in the US for training, not sent to the far side of the world while the storm clouds darkened over the Atlantic. MacArthur's Philippine Army might have covered the gap - if it had been given another two years to train and organise.
And on top of this, the US was still hoping to avoid a war, while still putting the economic squeeze on Japan over the China war. This led the Americans (like the British) to drift into a policy of trying to deter the Japanese with a rather paper-tiger show of strength in the Pacific, while ordering their people on the spot to avoid provoking Japan with anything that might look like genuine war preparations, while crossing their fingers that none of it would prove necessary.
So the problem facing the US in the Philippines, TTL or ATL, is not "that corrupt buffoon MacArthur wilfully sabotaging the defence", it's that successfully defending the place is extremely hard and quite probably impossible barring a major change in US strategy several years in advance. By the time you get to late-1941, fiddling around with radar deployments and organisation and supply stocks is basically overhauling the lifeboats on the Titanic - you may make the upcoming disaster a bit less awful, but it's still going to be a disaster. And another handful of destroyers or bombers or artillery batteries aren't going to change very much.
yes and no; the Army controlled minefields, but the Navy , after the war warning , could mine approaches to it's bases, which it did. The landing beaches to within 16" gun range ( largest army coastal artillery) were army responsibility. With Mac Arthur restricting Harts subs and PBYs from actively patrolling near Formosa, Hart, cannot position his subs until too late. In addition most of the waters near the invasion beaches were about 100-200 foot deep and clear. Suicide for a sub. PT's did not have the range to make a speed run to and from the invasion beaches, and no tender to support them. OTL in the SW Pacific and Solomons, some of the 4 pipers repurposed as seaplane tenders were again repurposed as PT tenders. Hart's destroyers except the 2 damage at Cavite had all moved south out of Japanese air range.
that was the discussion for the airfields the placement of at least one or more carrier sized air groups of USN/USMC, on these fields. Of course Del Monte was USAAF. The locations I listed were already used by the USN as bases for PATWING 10 and it's tenders with some shore facilities.
I believe the older battleships were held back, both as a reserve, but more importantly, IMO because they were fuel hogs.
Did the USN have any carrier-size air groups to spare in 1941, without stripping their carriers or training units? Likewise could the USAAF have spared a couple of air groups, if there had been facilities for them? I know that in 1940-1 they were expanding rapidly, but from a very low base, and I'm not sure how much was available when.
More to the point, could the USN/USAAF have made the commitment that the planes would be available, at the point when the decision to upgrade the airfields would have to be made? Otherwise you risk falling into the "if you build it, they will come" mentality that the British fell for OTL in Malaya.
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
Hi Admiral Jellicoe, I agree with Butchpfd that the older Japanese battleships were fuel hogs, but at this stage of the war, I don't think fuel economy was such a concern, capturing the Dutch East Indies was. However, the Japanese always looked upon the US Navy as their biggest threat, and the basic Japanese war plan was to grab the resources of South East Asia, form a defensive ring, and await the US onslaught. Despite the losses at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese still expected a very strong US fleet to come sailing across the Pacific, and they were very clear as to how they would defeat that, using the Kantai Kessen battle doctrine, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kantai_Kessen. Having attrite the US forces with submarines, aircraft and night attacks with light forces, they would wade in with the battleship line, and those battleships had to be held back for that. The Kongo class was not considered essential for the battle line, they would be used as part of the night attacks, if they survived that, then they too would join the battle line, which meant they were also available for other uses. So we see them in the South China Sea, ready to engage Force Z, in the Solomon's and as fast escort to the Kido Butai.
Take a look at Fuso's TROM, see http://www.combinedfleet.com/Fuso.html,, Ise at http://www.combinedfleet.com/Ise.htm, and Nagato at http://www.combinedfleet.com/nagatrom.htm, they just didn't risk them on any other ops.
MWI 41120208 The Arrival Of The Prince
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
1941, Tuesday 02 December;
The big grey battleship slid slowly along the Johore Straits, a tug in attendance as she began her docking procedure. Dockside, stood almost the entire high command of the Far East, Admiral’s Phillips, Layton and Spooner, General’s Gort, Percival, Rowell, and Simmons, Air Vice Marshal Park and Governor Caldecott, to welcome her, while photographers, journalists and film crew were all on hand to record the event. Britain was firmly committed to defending the Far East, and meant business, and here was the proof, one of her best battleships. And she led in a strike force, Force Z, that had just been given 72 hours to be ready.
HMS Prince of Wales, although less than a year old, was already a veteran, having faced the Bismarck in May, taken Churchill to a meeting with Roosevelt across the Atlantic in August, and fought a convoy battle in the Med in September. One of the major reasons why the new battleship was so formidable, was her array of radar systems, something quite unappreciated by the Japanese. A Type 281 early air warning radar, four Type 285, one for each High Angle Director Tower to use with the 5.25-inch guns, four Type 282 and associated pom-pom directors, a Type 284 fire control for the main armament forward, and a Type 273 surface radar, with a range of up to 25 miles. POW had problems with some of her radars, including the Type 273 radar, which wasn’t currently working, and massive problems with the heat and humidity, and while the radar could be fixed, the heat couldn’t and crew would have to be rotated every 2 hours in the boiler and machinery rooms, when the heat became extreme, while on operations.
And following her in was the rest of the ships of Force Z, the old battlecruiser, HMS Repulse, equipped with a Type 286P air warning and Type 284 fire control radars, was going into dry dock for a quick bottom scrap, which would take a good day, While the four accompanying destroyers, HMS Jupiter, Electra, Encounter and Express, would only get patch and make do. Meaning Encounter had to postpone the renewal of a propeller bush, and repair to her corrugated bottom, curtesy of a grounding in the Med, along with Jupiter, a wet ship due to poor workmanship when first built, who needed remedial work to correct her stability when she had full fuel tanks.
Dockyard crews and specialists were already waiting, schedules planned, to attend to the problems that they had been told about previously, while the ships were in transit. The smaller repairs would be taken on, as all ships inevitably had a snagging list, major issues would be investigated, and planned for repair at a date yet to be determined. So, while ships captains were keen to let their crews have some liberty time, many of the professionals of the ships, the warrant and petty officers, found precious little of it coming their way.
Already here was the county class heavy cruiser HMS Cornwall which was quayside waiting, as Repulse had carried extra Type 286P radar sets from the UK, for the dockyard to begin fitting one, although it was unlikely to be ready in the short time given. Also, anchored in the straits, was the heavy cruiser HMS Exeter, fitted with a Type 279 early warning & Type 284 fire control radars, and the Australian destroyer HMAS Vampire. These had already received the dockyard treatment, in as much as could be done before the arrival of the rest of the force. Currently in attendance was a small fleet of tankers, ammunition and stores lighters, alongside the anchored ships busy replenishing them
Two light cruisers of the D class, HMS Danae and HMS Dragon had arrived yesterday from Indian Ocean escort work, but these wouldn’t be joining Force Z, the British cruisers being deemed too obsolete for this work. The S class destroyer Stronghold had also arrived and was now scheduled to undertake some more urgent minelaying, having previously been converting into a minelayer, replacing the torpedo tubes and aft guns, allowing the accommodation of 40 mines and their rails. Another S class destroyer, HMS Thanet, working with the submarine HMS Rover, was providing anti-submarine training to ships of the fleet, after they had their ASDIC fitted, and wasn’t currently available.
However, tomorrow, the ‘Light Squadron’ was due to arrive, from further fleet exercises, and the six ships of that force would be available, if Phillips deemed it necessary to add them. The urgency created an exciting buzz around the harbour, which didn’t go unnoticed by the local Japanese spies, who duly reported back. While later the daily C5M2 ‘Babs’ that cruised over at 36,000 ft, was able to confirm two battleships, once her photographs had been developed and analysed. The Prince had arrived.
The big grey battleship slid slowly along the Johore Straits, a tug in attendance as she began her docking procedure. Dockside, stood almost the entire high command of the Far East, Admiral’s Phillips, Layton and Spooner, General’s Gort, Percival, Rowell, and Simmons, Air Vice Marshal Park and Governor Caldecott, to welcome her, while photographers, journalists and film crew were all on hand to record the event. Britain was firmly committed to defending the Far East, and meant business, and here was the proof, one of her best battleships. And she led in a strike force, Force Z, that had just been given 72 hours to be ready.
HMS Prince of Wales, although less than a year old, was already a veteran, having faced the Bismarck in May, taken Churchill to a meeting with Roosevelt across the Atlantic in August, and fought a convoy battle in the Med in September. One of the major reasons why the new battleship was so formidable, was her array of radar systems, something quite unappreciated by the Japanese. A Type 281 early air warning radar, four Type 285, one for each High Angle Director Tower to use with the 5.25-inch guns, four Type 282 and associated pom-pom directors, a Type 284 fire control for the main armament forward, and a Type 273 surface radar, with a range of up to 25 miles. POW had problems with some of her radars, including the Type 273 radar, which wasn’t currently working, and massive problems with the heat and humidity, and while the radar could be fixed, the heat couldn’t and crew would have to be rotated every 2 hours in the boiler and machinery rooms, when the heat became extreme, while on operations.
And following her in was the rest of the ships of Force Z, the old battlecruiser, HMS Repulse, equipped with a Type 286P air warning and Type 284 fire control radars, was going into dry dock for a quick bottom scrap, which would take a good day, While the four accompanying destroyers, HMS Jupiter, Electra, Encounter and Express, would only get patch and make do. Meaning Encounter had to postpone the renewal of a propeller bush, and repair to her corrugated bottom, curtesy of a grounding in the Med, along with Jupiter, a wet ship due to poor workmanship when first built, who needed remedial work to correct her stability when she had full fuel tanks.
Dockyard crews and specialists were already waiting, schedules planned, to attend to the problems that they had been told about previously, while the ships were in transit. The smaller repairs would be taken on, as all ships inevitably had a snagging list, major issues would be investigated, and planned for repair at a date yet to be determined. So, while ships captains were keen to let their crews have some liberty time, many of the professionals of the ships, the warrant and petty officers, found precious little of it coming their way.
Already here was the county class heavy cruiser HMS Cornwall which was quayside waiting, as Repulse had carried extra Type 286P radar sets from the UK, for the dockyard to begin fitting one, although it was unlikely to be ready in the short time given. Also, anchored in the straits, was the heavy cruiser HMS Exeter, fitted with a Type 279 early warning & Type 284 fire control radars, and the Australian destroyer HMAS Vampire. These had already received the dockyard treatment, in as much as could be done before the arrival of the rest of the force. Currently in attendance was a small fleet of tankers, ammunition and stores lighters, alongside the anchored ships busy replenishing them
Two light cruisers of the D class, HMS Danae and HMS Dragon had arrived yesterday from Indian Ocean escort work, but these wouldn’t be joining Force Z, the British cruisers being deemed too obsolete for this work. The S class destroyer Stronghold had also arrived and was now scheduled to undertake some more urgent minelaying, having previously been converting into a minelayer, replacing the torpedo tubes and aft guns, allowing the accommodation of 40 mines and their rails. Another S class destroyer, HMS Thanet, working with the submarine HMS Rover, was providing anti-submarine training to ships of the fleet, after they had their ASDIC fitted, and wasn’t currently available.
However, tomorrow, the ‘Light Squadron’ was due to arrive, from further fleet exercises, and the six ships of that force would be available, if Phillips deemed it necessary to add them. The urgency created an exciting buzz around the harbour, which didn’t go unnoticed by the local Japanese spies, who duly reported back. While later the daily C5M2 ‘Babs’ that cruised over at 36,000 ft, was able to confirm two battleships, once her photographs had been developed and analysed. The Prince had arrived.
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It might depend where the battle occurs.
Is it to be fought in the Makassar Strait? If this is so, the application of IJN air power is reduced. ADM Nagumo is somewhat loathe to fight in those restricted waters.
I'd like to see the dustup between Belitung Island and Karimata Island in the Karimata Strait. It's off of SW Borneo. Lots of shoals and islands. Near the limits of IJN aircraft flights, if a TG from Kido Butai is operating in the So. China Sea out from maybe Kuala Terenggaru. The IJN TG will have to fight their way in and out. The same for the surface component. This is of course forced because Coxy's scenario allows for enlargement of the Malayan effort.
Can the four R-Class BB's be sent forward to complement the already present RN and USN forces? The Dutch will know the waters particularly well. The British will have some familiarity as to where the hull ripping patches are located. The Americans will have RNN officers aboard with charts for the nav table. Maybe? It would be interesting.
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I believe that the effect is Island (English) vs. Continent (Dutch). I can't perceive the Adams family as being aristocrats. Neither would Washington of Jefferson!
I believe that there were submarines present outside the Lingayen Gulf.
The forces were still about two weeks out at minimum, on 9 DEC 41. The Navy has written off the PI long ago. I'm just wondering if a squadron(s) of F4F and a squadron of SB2U might have an affect as CAP in the Java Sea. Better late than never?
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I read an archived article from a 1938 Manila paper. The Philippine Congress had approved a substantial amount for training the PI Army. This amount was to conduct a six month training period with upwards of 50,000 men called up to service. This was to be followed on the next fiscal year. I get the impression that it became a one off deal.
Luzon has so many landing areas, that it's indefensible. The initial plan was to keep the passengers in steerage. The General placed the deck chairs topside and closer to the sea.
S - Boats were there, they were outside the 200 foot/ 35 fathom limit. the S- Boats even tried night surface attacks but, once the Japanese were inside the Gulf it was up to land and air to defend the P.I. The only way to prevent the invasion from closing was better recon. By the time of the invasion PATWING 10 had been halved ,with half of the planes surviving being the ones in the Southern islands.